Taiwan is the most indomitable problem in Sino-American relations and the most plausible theater of conflict between the two great powers. The “Taiwan problem” has existed for decades but is today more volatile and potentially damaging than ever. Rising tensions across the Taiwan Strait, paired with the People’s Republic of China’s rapidly increasing military capabilities, point to an uncertain future of the island and the balance of power between the United States (US) and China.1 Further, common understandings of the Taiwan problem are rapidly losing credibility in the face of a changed world wherein China’s conventional and nuclear capabilities are on track to rival those of the US. This article combines an analysis of China’s military capabilities in a Taiwan scenario with robust examination of perceptual factors in Sino-American relations that may complicate escalation management. This research aims to understand the role that perceptual factors paly in China’s defense posture and risk of nuclear escalation over Taiwan. When evaluating China’s nuclear posture, it is critical to note the perceptual roles of not just China but also the US. In nuclear and security studies, especially analyses produced by US analysts reliant on American data and references, there exists a prevailing idea that the US is a fundamental protector of the global order, and any military or nuclear development from countries the US considers strategic opponents is viewed as, at minimum, threatening. Beyond that, there is often an assumption that international security crises will develop primarily because of logical and rational choices. But as Kristensen et al. note, the US operates large numbers of silo-based missiles and systems designed to protect its retaliatory capabilities and insists this posture is necessary and stabilizing.2 It is entirely reasonably, then, that China may seek a similar posture. Yet Chinese nuclear development is met by American skepticism and concern, contributing to conversations about the “pacing challenge” of China, or a new Cold War framework for the US-China relationship. This contributes to the foreign policy concept of mutual constitution or reciprocity, which Kyle Haynes and Brandon Yoder explain is the “degree to which one state’s behavior shifts to match another’s previous actions.”3 In the US-China case, this means that when the US treats China as something threatening which must be contained, China in turn will become something 1 Throughout this paper I will refer to the People’s Republic of China simply as China. The Republic of China will be referred to as Taiwan. 2 Kristensen et al., “Chinese Nuclear Weapons 2024,” 182. 3 Haynes, Kyle, and Brandon K. Yoder. “Trust, Cooperation, and the Tradeoffs of Reciprocity.” Conflict Management & Peace Science 41, no. 1 (January 1, 2024): 26–46. 2 the US must contain. Analyses which sensationalize Chinese military and nuclear development beyond practical applications tend to do more harm than good by contributing to this damaging framework. However, it is still valuable to analyze China’s nuclear modernization and rapidly rising conventional military capabilities, especially in the context of the Taiwan problem. This article proceeds in four sections, beginning with relevant background information and a review of the literature on perceptual factors in international relations and, more specifically, the US-China context. The second section draws on open-source data to analyze China’s changing military capabilities, focusing on China’s nuclear development. The third section introduces perceptual factors as a frame of analysis, opening with an exploration of the potential breakdown of deterrence and operationalizing three main facets of perception: signaling, security dilemma and entanglement, and wartime perceptual shift. The final section frames the implications of conventional war and nuclear war between the US and China, as well as of Chinese control of Taiwan, then concludes with recommendations to inform future policies and research. In general, this analysis finds that perceptual factors play a key role in Sino-American relations, especially over Taiwan. Moreover, analysis of potential outcomes identifies catastrophic risk that are driven by these perceptual factors, and that exist at an intensity such that mitigation must be prioritized. This article highlights multiple pathways to tandem escalation and deescalation, indicating that the Taiwan issue is highly complex and should be carefully considered through broad analytical lenses and multiple theoretical frameworks.
Strait to Catastrophe: the Role of Perceptual Factors in US-China-Taiwan Defense Posture and Nuclear Escalation
