The Arctic is not often under the geopolitical spotlight, due to its remote location, low levels of human activity and longstanding period of peace and cooperation following the fall of the Soviet Union. In most recent years, however, this forgotten region has witnessed a slow but steady increase in military investments, especially on behalf of the Russian Federation, one of five Arctic States. The motives behind states’ renewed interest in the Arctic can be traced back to 2007, when a sudden exogenous shock caused a loss of ice greater than the size of Texas and California together. This shock unveiled a significant amount of natural resources – primarily oil and gas – previously hidden under kilometers of thick ice, and made them much easier to extract. Climate change and rising temperatures are making this once-hostile region much more accessible to Arctic and “near-Arctic” states, which are building the capabilities necessary to operate in this environment. With Russia doubling down on the modernization of old Soviet military bases, the region has become a new center for Great Power competition. While China has only recently become interested in accessing the Arctic’s natural resources, Russia is much more familiar with this region’s challenges and opportunities, and has engaged in power projection and hybrid threats to communicate its intentions to establish itself as a Great Arctic Power. The United States is lacking Arctic presence and operability after the dismantling of many military bases and infrastructure following the end of the Cold War. In this context, the United States is confronted with a new Arctic dilemma: how to respond to Russia’s new threats in the High North? What is the optimal investment in Arctic military capabilities that will deter Russian threats without escalating tensions and increasing the risk of conflict? To answer these questions I use the framework developed by Charles Glaser in his famous paper, “When are Arms Races Dangerous? Rational vs Suboptimal Arming”. I evaluate the conditions required for three potential policies to succeed and then weigh the costs and benefits of each one. The three policies can be summarized as follows: 1. Arms Buildup Policy: the US chooses to build up its offensive capabilities in the Arctic, 2. Self-Restraint Policy: the US decides not to build up its military capabilities and maintain the current status quo, 3. ISR Investment Policy: the US opts to invest in domain awareness and surveillance capabilities rather than arms. After evaluating the ideal conditions for each policy to be the optimal policy, I reach the conclusion that the United States should invest in domain awareness and ISR capabilities in the Arctic to monitor Russia’s activities and promptly react to potential military threats.
